Throughout the past century, research into human genetics revealed the relationships between biochemistry and various human characteristics in increasing detail. At each step of this path of discovery, social critics warned that knowledge of genetics, and especially social attention to genetics, might heighten racist attitudes. In light of these warnings and the recent sequencing of the Human Genome, it is important to inquire into the interpretations laypersons might hold of the relationship between race and genetics. A variety of recent efforts have described the insufficiency of public opinion polls for arriving at sophisticated understandings of such complex attitudinal structures. Therefore, this essay offers a sketch of some lay understandings of race and genetics in the United States based on a series of focus group sessions. In order to interpret the responses, the analysis employs a novel template for interpreting focus group research based on the theoretical concept of rhetorical formations. This approach reveals the way in which the knowledge of individual members is brought to bear upon collective decision-making through the social process of discussion to produce a pool of information that is similar to expert knowledge, although phrased in a popular vocabulary. Differences in the ways in which cultural groups negotiate this knowledge are discussed.
Barbara Katz Rothman uses the label "microeugenics," but she constructs the same historical plot: The racist eugenics of the first half of the twentieth century was transformed into an effectively racist genetics at the end of the century. 5 She argues that "Blood has ceased to be the powerful metaphor it once was. Essence has moved further inward, from blood to genes. No longer visible, no longer divisible, race has moved inward from body to blood to genes." 6 She suggests this linkage is inevitable, answering her own question, "Can there be a science of race that is not scientific racism?" with a firm, "I don't think so." 7 Lily Kay has traced some of the financial and organizational linkages between the old eugenics and the new genetics, 8 and Troy Duster has employed the perspectives of the sociology of knowledge to provide a theoretical linkage between old and new. He argues that the social framework employed by genetics is a tool of the dominant race and notes that just at the point in the intellectual history of the West when "race" was getting to be treated in both science and enlightened lay quarters as something no more than skindeep, just when the social sciences thought they had won the battle with hereditarians over the fundamentally arbitrary importance of race in society, a new development came along to shake this assumption at its core: the growth of a body of research showing that genetic disorders were distributed differently through different racial and ethnic groups. 9 Duster indicates that the foregrounding of this new social knowledge was problematic both because it allowed the targeting of specific ethnic groups for purportedly medical purposes, and because it raised a potent, related question,
"If genetic disorders are differentially distributed by race and ethnicity, why aren't other human traits and characteristics?"
Since genetic research has been used for racist ends in the past, and since it raises problematic questions, these critics argue that we should stop studying and attending to questions of genetics. Katz Rothman insists, "there is no way of describing human variation around the world without invoking the history and the politics of race. That is why it is not safe" to study genetics. "Deal with poverty," she says, "and then get back to me on genetics research." 11 Such attacks on genetics have provoked two kinds of response. Conservative voices have decried such arguments on the grounds that they place "political correctness" over "truth," and some conservatives have trudged ahead, attempting to use "scientific" evidence to establish that social inequities have, indeed, resulted from inherited qualities of different social groups. Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray published a best-selling book that is consonant with this perspective. 12 They argue that races "differ intellectually on average,"that an individual's realized intelligence "is not very malleable," and therefore, a variety of policies should be adopted including both "scrapping" discrimination law and "dealing with demography" by ceasing to subsidize "births among poor women, who are also disproportionately at the low end of the intelligence distribution." 13 Herrnstein and Murray do not claim that all differences in measured intelligence between races are genetic. However, much of their argument defends the linkage between IQ and race, and IQ and genetics, and they expend substantial effort in the paperback edition defending the three-way linkage between race, IQ, and genes. 14 The work of Herrnstein and Murray clearly illustrates that the concerns of the social critics are not merely straw arguments. There are indeed prominent, highly publicized intellectuals who use the topic of genetics in precisely the ways that the social critics have feared. Nonetheless, this is not the only usage to which genetics discourses can be put.
During the last two decades, many prominent geneticists have argued that recent investigations into the human genome have revealed that members of all ethnic and racial groups are essentially similar to one another at the biological level. Jonathan Marks's widely cited book, Human Biodiversity, argues at length that "Anthropological genetics, which was developed in order to validate racial categories-to find a hard hereditary basis by which to divide the human species-was never able to do so." 15 In 1999, at the annual meeting of the American Association for Human Genetics, Francis Collins, director of the Human Genome Project, suggested that more recent research had reaffirmed this conclusion, demonstrating that "separation of the human population into precisely defined racial categories is scientifically unjustifiable." 16 These conclusions are based on the discovery that "most genetic variations are found in most populations, though in varying proportions." 17 There is, therefore, no set of genes that all White people have and all other peoples lack, and this holds for all large social groupings. There are relatively few variations in DNA that are present in one socially defined racial group but completely absent in other population groups. Population geneticists such as CavalliSforza, and geneticists such as Lewontin, offer three reasons why there is more diversity within so-called human races than there is between members of such groups. 18 The first is that racial groupings are social labels placed upon biologically disparate groups of people. For example, in the United States both persons from the Watusi lineages and from the socalled "pygmy" heritages are categorized as "Blacks." Given the recognizable differences in these groups, it is not too surprising that members of the social categories into which they are constituted ("Blacks") manifest significant genetic variation. But even where linkages between social classifications and biological lineages are more congruent, genetic diversity within groups is still greater than genetic diversity between groups. This occurs because human groupings have always intermarried with one another to some extent, and because there has been relatively little evolutionary time for divergence among human groups since the point at which humans diverged from pre-human ancestors. Therefore, most of the diversity within the human population was there from the start, before various groups went wandering around the planet, evolving external physical differences in skin color, body build, and hair texture.
According to these population geneticists, genetics science has thus not constituted a "science of race," so much as it has deconstructed the purported biological foundations of race. The population geneticists' discourse thus at least raises the possibility that doing research on biology is not inevitably associated with support for a world view that categorizes races as discrete groupings with different levels of merit and worth, and which dismisses social contributions to inequity. 19 The news media in the United States have highlighted the view offered by the population geneticists more positively than that offered by Herrnstein and Murray. 20 Stephanie Houston Grey has even dubbed The Bell Curve "the most vilified book of the decade." 21 But it is not necessarily the case that what the press reports is what the populace believes. Indeed, Herrnstein and Murray have suggested that it is the more conservative view, one with an "accusatory" tone that dominates the discussions of lay people. They argue that Just beneath the surface of American life, people talk about race in ways that bear little resemblance to the politically correct public discussion. The underground conversation is not limited to a racist minority. It goes on everywhere, and we believe is increasingly shaped by privately held beliefs about the implications of genetic differences. 22 In light of the significance of these issues both for policy and human identity, it is crucial to know what effects this public debate about genetics and race might have had on the layperson. Therefore, we sought to explore how lay people understand the relationships between genetics and race. This is not a simple question to answer.
Methodology: who is the public and how do we know what it thinks?
Public opinion polling techniques have evolved to tap popular attitudes. Such techniques can be put to several good uses. Such methods, however, like all methods, have substantial limitations. As Entman and Rojecki have demonstrated, with regard to racial issues many people "hold opinions too complicated to be summarized by conventional surveys." 23 Public opinion polls are most effective at describing public thought about non-volatile, precisely delimited concepts and policies. They are less well adapted to exploring complex and volatile attitudes. As Frewer, Howard, and Shepherd suggest, instead of putting into the hands of pollsters the power to select the relevant vocabularies and define which issues are most salient, methodologies that allow members of the public more leeway to define the issues themselves are desirable. 24 In addition, public opinion polls are limited because they take an individualist perspective to public opinion, rather than treating public opinion as a collective product. As Davison, Barns, and Schibeci put it, public opinion polls "privilege the aggregated views of uninvolved mainstream individuals." 25 Polls are incapable of tracing the interactions that develop through a conversation among citizens about public policy issues. Finally, polls tend to assume what Davison, Barns, and Schibeci call a "unitary public."
26 Polls focus attention on majority opinions rather than emphasizing the available range of opinions and the different concerns that variations in vocabularies and opinions might highlight.
To provide an alternative access to popular attitudes, focus group methodology has become increasingly common across the past decade. 27 Focus groups generally do not provide representative portraits of national opinions as do survey research methodologies. However, when properly employed, focus groups can reveal important information about the complexities and inter-relationships among lay attitudes about significant social topics. In order to maximize the strengths of focus groups, however, changes in standard approaches to interpreting focus group data are needed.
The tendency in the reporting of focus group data is to adopt the focus on the norm, the mean, or the majority that is typical of polling and other social scientific research. While such conclusions may be useful, we suggest that it is equally important to use focus groups to represent the range of opinions and the structural development of those opinions. Rather than assuming that there is a single, dominant discursive formation at work in popular opinion, we suggest that popular opinions are equally likely to be polyphonic, and that an approach that seeks to map the lines of contestation and divergence, and the ranges of opinions available, is frequently appropriate. Focus group data will therefore often provide an accurate resource for mapping the "rhetorical formation," even though it cannot indicate what percentage of the population holds each of the varied positions. 28 Second, we suggest that where there is substantial consensus, the goal of a focus group interpretation is not simply to report that consensus, but rather to examine how that consensus emerges from the dynamics of various contributions and what resources exist in the various individual positions for strengthening or undermining this consensus. With regard to scientific and technical issues such as genetics, such an approach allows exploration of what the public knows about scientifically investigated topics in relationship to the body of scientific knowledge. Rather than employing what is often called the "deficit model" of public understanding of science, which seeks to test the public in order to show the failings of the public to employ scientific vocabularies and models, such an approach can reveal what the public knows about the topic in its own terms. 29 Such an approach then permits comparisons of lay understandings to scientific understandings without expecting the public knowledge to be framed within the scientific vocabularies.
Finally, focus group methodologies can preserve cultural specificity. While public opinion polls can and do report the opinions of different demographic groups, questions must be framed in a common vocabulary, usually one that takes up the concerns of more dominant groups rather than being culturally specific. This forces non-dominant groups to offer their answers exclusively through the framework of another demographic group. In contrast, focus groups can allow persons in different cultural groups to talk about similar topic domains, but to bring more of their own vocabularies and orientations directly to the discussion.
We suggest, therefore, that one appropriate approach to the interpretation and reporting of focus group research is to explore the popular rhetorical formations manifested in that discourse. This means that the researchers will seek to describe the range of opinions present in the discourse; that they may then explore emergent areas of consensus and the resources that support or challenge that consensus; and that one useful but not mandatory component of such explorations will be preserving the popular vocabularies, interests, or perspectives used by different social or cultural groups.
What does the lay public think about genetics?
A large and informative literature on lay attitudes about race exists, as does a large and informative literature about lay attitudes about genetics, and these literatures incorporate multiple methodologies. 30 These studies do not generally address simultaneously the issues of race and genetics, however. Therefore, we incorporated into a larger study of lay attitudes about genetics specific attention to the ways in which people understood the relationships between genes and race.
Participants: We conducted 17 focus groups (4 White male, 4 White female groups, 5 Black female groups, and 4 Black male groups) in a town associated with a large land grant university in the southeastern United States in the winter and spring of 2000. Participants were recruited through telephone solicitation via random digit dialing (n = 24), community sponsor recruitment (n = 40), and a snowball technique (n = 19) in which individuals recruited to participate were invited to bring an acquaintance (which could include friends or family members). Individuals who had received genetic testing or counseling, or who indicated in screening questions that they "know all there is to know" or "know a great deal" about human genetics were eliminated from further consideration for participation as a method of defining the "lay" as compared to a more knowledgeable or experienced and expert public.
Participants (N = 82) in the 17 focus groups included 39 women (including 19 Blacks) and 43 males (including 23 Whites). The average age of participants was 28.55 years (SD = 6.19). Their income included 16 percent who made less than $10,000, 24 percent in the $10,000-$25,000 range, 29 percent making $25,000-$40,000, 10 percent in the $40,000-$55,000 range, and 16 percent making $55,000 or more. Nearly half of the participants had some college, with 49.4 percent indicating that they had completed a college course in biology. Another 38.6 percent reported that they had taken a biology class in high school.
After general introductions, the focus group leader, who was matched for race with the participants, introduced a series of open-ended questions about the group's understanding of genetics. The question, "Do persons of different races have the same genes?" and three probes designed to flesh out answers to this question, occurred in the third set of questions. The results below reflect the answers to this question. We have also indicated the few instances when other questions provided related information. To protect confidentiality of participants and maintain specificity, females are identified by even numbers and males by odd; African American participants have numbers from one to 50, while European Americans have numbers from fifty-one to one hundred.
The range of views
The expressed views of our participants varied across a fairly broad range on one primary dimension: the degree to which they thought different races shared different genes. The question they were asked was "Do persons of different races have the same genes?" Several respondents indicated that people of multiple races would still have the same genes, thus denying a view of race as a categorical, biologically based entity. Participant 85, a White male, offered this response: "I'd say they would be the same. I mean we all have two eyes and one nose and two ears and all that. That's all decided by your genes, what you look like," while a Black male respondent (P21) agreed, reasoning that "since different races have the same blood type I would think if it is related I would think that we would have to have some of the same."
In contrast, other participants spoke about race as a more clear, stable and identifiable set of characteristics that corresponded with the presence or absence of particular genes. One White female (P66) said, "I take the other view. I guess if I am thinking race and I'm thinking different genes obviously affect different colors and pigments in our skins." Similarly, two African American women articulated the view that genes were related to stable biological differences between Whites and Blacks: P14: . . . I have seen some biracial kids that the dominant trait seems to be that the Black [genes] . I can see the Blackness and they have White mothers. P12: Yeah, you see the Blackness, you will see the blackness. . . . I won't look at that kid and think that kid [has] two Black parents.
Several respondents thus emphasized two poles of a continuum-either the similarity of the races and the genes they shared or discrete differences among people that identified what they understood as a racial characteristic.
In between these extremes were a range of responses that emphasized both shared traits and difference in genetics, but most of these commentaries emphasized the smallness of the difference. Participant 57, a White male, said, "Basically similar because we're still the same species or mammal. Just subtle differences." Another White male gave a number to this small level of difference, referencing the mass media in the process:
I think I read somewhere or heard somewhere, maybe Clinton said something about. . . . I think he said 99 percent of your genes are all the same. It's just like. . . even more than that. I think there is just like a really small percentage of genes that are different that account for all of the different races and different types of people (P61).
One of the clearest indicators of how lay people understand the relationship between genetics and race is the extent to which they think that race is visible in the DNA. Our participants expressed both ends of this spectrum. One African American man (7) articulated the view that race was readable in DNA, when he indicated, "I think that people of different races do have a lot of similarities in terms of genes but then of course there are differences. But you would be able to establish the race of someone through their DNA or their genes." A European American female (56) disagreed, saying, "I mean while there are some differences, bottom line could you look at someone's genes and tell their race. . . probably not."
Constructing collective wisdom
Our participants expressed a moderately broad range of understandings about what the biological character of race might be. Nonetheless, there was a relatively clear set of limitations to the range of these views, creating a consensus position. We believe that a socially shared interpretation evolved in several of the groups featuring these two components: (1) racial groupings of people have a shared biological underpinning that includes a genetic component, but (2) these biological characteristics are relatively few and primarily physical or external, relating to things like skin, hair, body build and some kinds of disease.
A Black female expressed this position in her statement, "I relate genes to your features like your eyes, your nose. Things you inherit, not your personality," (P12). A White female also expressed this perspective when she said, "Except for the things that make one race a race and those are mostly physical characteristics. You know skin color, shape of nose, slant of eyes like that. . . fullness of lips" (P58).
Interracial mating was often used as a resource for thinking out the issues involved in genetics and race. Fourteen people in six different groups explicitly referred to interracial mating. Because these ruminations led people to imagine two racially distinct parents and biracial offspring, they tended to carry along the assumption that there was a physically identifiable and distinct set of racial characteristics, but also that those characteristics lacked much significance outside of the physical traits that could be observed in the process of mixing. An African American man's comment illustrates the dynamics of this analysis: "Ok. I'll give you an example of where it could. Black person, White person. Say they both say you could have a situation where you have siblings where one could be Black and one could be White. They would have to have almost the same genes. Even being siblings, you've still got one that is one race and one that is another race physically . . . the look on the outside . . . but inside they are the same" (P21).
The analysis of intermarriage operated within a constrained range of social assumptions, but it seemed to be useful for the respondents because it allowed the foregrounding of both difference and similarity, which were widely shared assumptions (though in patterns that varied by race and gender, as we will explore below).
The race-mixing analysis also was consistent with an emphasis on genetics and race as primarily related to external features. Only two descriptions of racial difference focused on behavior (including the superior persistence of Blacks at work, by Blacks) and three to talents, specifically the superior "rhythm" of Blacks (all by Blacks). No participant mentioned intelligence. Thirteen referred to skin color, seven to hair texture, eight to illnesses, nine to body build, strength or athleticism, three to facial structure, and two to blood type. Two participants explicitly denied the link of race and genetics to personality or behavior (and in later questions, one person raised the issue of the link between, race, genes, and intelligence with regard to Asians, only to refute it). This strong emphasis that race is exclusively a physical matter is all the more striking because participants linked genes to intellectual abilities, behaviors, and talents fairly strongly in later questions. Thus, even though the participants believed that genes contributed both to racial differences and mental abilities, they were able to produce an account of race in which these two genetic linkages were independent of each other. This is a sophisticated account that coheres well with the account of human genetic and racial variation offered by population geneticists. As we will see shortly, this conclusion is the product of a collectively generated, non-technical understanding of many of the components of genetic analysis used by population geneticists.
Building social wisdom collectively
When we say that most of the groups produced a social knowledge of genetics and race as a complicated territory of shared and distinct characteristics and genes, almost all of which resided in physical features, we are not making a claim about a neatly bounded set of opinions that were fully and individually expressed by the majority of respondents. Rather, we are referring to the flow of the discussion in each of the groups. Often, the discussions proceeded through a process of mutual correction or augmentation, so that the group's understanding of the relationship between race and genetics became progressively more complex and elaborate as the discussion wore on. Respondents helped each other consider facets of the issue they had not previously considered. Sometimes the group came up with an explicit and more nuanced account than the individual accounts that had been offered along the way. Other times, such shared accounts were left undeveloped. In either case, one could not posit total agreement with the shared perspective that had been crafted, but one could posit that a set of understandings had been made available for shared consideration and perhaps action, and that this set of understandings was not fully available to most or any of the individuals before the discussion. We quote at length a set of interactions to illustrate this phenomenon and the perspective it generated. The conversation is intact, except for one deleted ethnic self-reference that might be offensive in the more racially differentiated context of this journal.
P19: "No because. . . You know. . . it was a dude that got fired off a TV network. . . . I can't think of his name. Jimmy the Greek, that's who it was. He pointed out that there was different genes between Black and White. We can run faster, we can jump higher, I mean because of the genes. And. . . he pointed out that it was genetics and he got fired for it. He was telling the truth because like I said Crackers are thicker and they anyway they can run, they can block they can do all of that. Anyway, Nxxxxs got speed. [Other participants' laughter]. Anyway. . . no man I ain't trying to be funny. I'm just speaking my mind cause like I said I read and I be up on things the way I want to. But anyway, not yet there's a difference and I'll leave that alone." P17: "I would have to say yes and no cause we are all human so we all have pretty much similar backgrounds. Most everybody has two eyes, two sets of lips, you've got hair, just like differences in the genetic pool which gives us our variations. Different skin color, some races are thicker than another, some for the most part are taller than some are shorter. But overall it's a yes and no answer." P19: "But the Black nation we cover. . . we cover pigmy to Zulu. We're tall and we're short. Anyway we different. I know this." P15: "I would say it's a little bit of both. You think back. . . look at it in time. African Americans are from Africa where White folks they are from Europe. And this is sort of an adaptation, you know. In Africa it's hot or whatever so. . . I mean that's how. . . . I mean we have melatonin in our skin where. . . that's while the White folks up in the Caucasoid Mountains up in Russia. I mean there was no need for melatonin so this is why they are so pale. It's I mean. . . " P19: "You done read some books, boy." P15: "It's dealing with your origin and aspects of two different people but also you've got other races. But I would say yes and no also." P19: "I believe you are about right. That was tight." P11: "I agree with that also." P9: "Yeah, me too."
This dialogue shows a development of the collectively available understandings, as participant 19 starts with a strong statement that emphasizes racial differences and gains some comradely reaction from the other participants. But 17 responds with an alternative perspective. He does not deny 19's observation of differences, but he incorporates that in a perspective that recognizes similarity and difference. 19 cooperates in this broadening of perspective, and adds his own complexity, noting that even African Americans differ among themselves. Participant 15 then endorses the "similarity and difference" perspective and adds an evolutionary perspective, which makes the similarities and differences fluid through time. 19 seconds 15's contribution (having noted that "I read and I be up on the things," he praises 15 by saying that "you done read some books"). 15 then re-emphasizes the point of the contribution as highlighting the simultaneous existence of similarity and difference, and the group enthusiastically endorses the account of race and genetics they have built: it's "tight."
This conversational interlude illustrates the way in which the sum of collective social knowledge, even among laypersons, is greater than their individual knowledge. Individuals contribute pieces of knowledge and interpretations to construct a broader understanding that reflects multiple aspects of the reality with which the group is trying to come to terms.
Social wisdom and scientific knowledge
This conversational interlude also illustrates the extent to which the popular understanding of race and genetics parallels that of contemporary geneticists. Although these people would probably all fail an exam in population genetics and as individuals know only bits and pieces of information about heredity, collectively they are able to reproduce much of the basic pattern about human heredity and the relationship between genes and race that the geneticists currently endorse. This includes at least three important inputs to human racial variation, along with the existence and dominance of individual variation over racial variation, the character of perceived racial variation as a matter of frequencies of distribution of various genes, and the existence of variable expression and relative dominance of genes.
Different participants articulated three of the major factors that influence contemporary patterns of genetic variation and their relationship to perceived racial distinctiveness, including the original similarity of human groups, the influence of like-kind mating, and the role of evolutionary adaptation. Like participant 15 quoted above, participant 9 also references evolutionary adaptations that may have accounted for external differences among the races. He accounts for racial difference noting that it is "just like any species adapts to their surrounding." Participant 62 integrates both the fact that human beings come from a shared evolutionary origin and the fact that mating patterns might eventually produce patterns of difference when she explains: "I mean I know that like because of your genetic makeup certain people can be more predisposed to disease or something and that there are certain diseases that this cultural group or this racial group are at risk for. But then if you look at historically there's cultural groups that only intermarry or produce together then they are going to keep that gene going. I don't think we start out with different genes but maybe because of the way we have grouped together one group maybe has a gene that is more prevalent than another." Participant 3 also takes the long view, in which mating patterns and original differences turn out to deny the existence of pure original racial stocks when he says, "A lot of genes are mixed, got mixed genes. I don't think personally think anyone is just one, like one race. I may be wrong. If you go way, way back down into our roots we will probably find some mixed races in the genes."
None of the participants articulates anything like the notion of genetic drift, and it is not clear to what extent they incorporate the "founder effect." Otherwise, these respondents understand the basic patterns of interracial biological evolution-like-kind mating, evolutionary adaptation, and shared origins-although they do not necessarily understand the scientists' terms for these phenomena, and though they lack precision in these concepts. Collectively, the groups also understand some of the other key genetic features that undergird the liberal geneticist's notions of the non-existence of categorically distinct biological races.
One of the key things that many of the participants understand is that individual variation swamps group-based variation. One focus group of White females, for example, starts with a comment by 82 that supports the claim of racial differences in genes: "But if everybody had the same genes they would look alike." Another participant agrees, "Right," but then 82 turns the insight against racial grouping itself, saying, "And that's not true for anybody from any racial group. They have large differences within own groups too." Participant 88 then agrees that the individual variation is more significant, saying, "Nobody really has the same genes anyway."
Several participants in multiple groups also articulate the idea that differences among races are a matter of the frequencies among genes, rather than categorical differences among genes or races. Participant 4 says to her colleagues, "Well, I think there are certain races that are races that have a certain tendency toward certain disorders like sickle cell anemia. But I think they would have the same genes but they might have a tendency to have that gene more often." Sometimes this view recognizes differences among "versions" (or alleles) of genes, and sometimes it does not. In either case, this frequency-based view of genetic difference is often linked to knowledge of disease conditions. The participants understand that genetic diseases are more prevalent in some groups, but not an essential characteristic of those groups, because the diseases are found in other groups as well. As participant 62 puts it, "together one group maybe has a gene that is more prevalent than another but I don't think it's different."
These lay people also understand the fairly sophisticated idea that it is not strictly speaking the case that people have different genes, but rather that there are different variations of the same gene, different levels of expression of genes, and perhaps even different levels of dominance among genes. Participant 78 articulates the view that people may harbor variations that are not related to having different genes per se, when she says, "Different races also have different dominant genes too. Like wider noses. . . things in each race. So they have maybe the same gene but like a different version of it." Participant 18 agrees, using the term "dominance" to refer to frequency of manifestation, saying "I think you have traits that are more dominant in one race than another but it's not just a cut and dry formula." Participant 80 appears to use the term dominant in a manner closer to the scientific version of the term when she states, "We are people, so we all have different genes but different genes would be dominant." Participant 73 adds the notion of the expression levels of genes when he admits that there may be racial differences, but says that "There are very, very small aspects that manifest in the expression of whichever genes it is."
And culture, too
The popular understandings of race and heredity offered by the lay participants in our groups include much of what formal study of genetics concludes, but the lay groups, because they are not "disciplined" to a narrow specialty, are also able to relate this knowledge to other subject matters. Several participants noted the interplay of culture and biology. Participant 18's response to a biologically focused comment made by another member illustrates the efforts of the group to come to terms with the complexities of the relationships between biology and culture. She pondered, "It is an interesting question and I wonder because I've seen some. I've seen some Indians that really do look like Africans, like they have some African ancestry in them and maybe they do have some mixture somewhere along the way. But I have mistaken Puerto Ricans for Black people. Just automatically assuming because someone has skin color, hair texture, the physical features that that person is Black and they would be Hispanic oriented or Puerto Rican, for example."
Largely, these focus groups are able to use the process of conversation to produce a substantial amount of collective wisdom about genetics and race. Although they often use vocabularies different from those of population geneticists, the understanding of human variation that they articulate is quite similar in basic outline to the progressive account offered by population geneticists.
Demographic patterning in responses
Although all four of our demographic groups participated in the consensus we described above, they also offered different inflections upon that consensus. These differences pertained most clearly to the particular body components that were linked with racial difference and to the ways in which the different groups handled the process of integrating similarity and difference.
All four groups were equally likely to reference skin color as an identifier of race. There were three such comments in the African American female, and European male and female groups, and four in the African American male group. But only African American females identified racial distinctiveness with hair type. Seven different comments by four different members in two different groups identified hair texture as the signifier of race. European American females were more likely to link racial difference to illness. Six different comments, by six different persons, in all four of the European American female groups referenced racial difference with examples built on genetically associated illnesses. Only one European American and one African American man marked race through disease, and no African American women did so.
African American males made what is likely to appear as the most controversial marking of race. They were more likely to use body build, strength, and athleticism as measures of racial distinctiveness than any other group. Seven different comments by five different participants in two different groups referenced such differences. Only one African American female, one European American male, and no European American females made comments of this type in response to these questions, though there were a few comments of this type by White males in response to later questions about the relationship of genes and physical abilities. In those comments, body build was described as generated by genetics and important to athletic success, and some Black athletes were used as examples. It is worth noting that when made by the Black participants, these comments were made with a sense of pride and seem to be used as positive markers of racial identity, which runs counter to widely expressed fears that linking athletic performance with racial identity might have a demeaning effect. This does not, of course, rule out secondary problems from such linkages.
In contrast to the other groups, European males did not uniquely identify any traits as particularly associated with racial differences, but this is probably related to their differencemanagement strategies in general (discussed below). One might speculate that these differences among the four groups reflect a complex socio-cultural patterning of the liabilities, responsibilities, and advantages of race and gender, though more investigation is clearly needed before a precise account of these patterns can be given.
In addition to demographic differences in the particular physical markers used to identify racial distinctiveness, there were also demographic patterns in how respondents managed the relationship of similarity and differences. All groups were equally likely, in passing, to posit differences, without either emphasizing these differences as essential qualities or downplaying them as insignificant. This can be measured by the number of talk turns in which these comments appeared in various groups (a "talk turn" is defined as the continuous comments of a participant from the moment they begin speaking until they stop speaking and another participant begins speaking). Comments mentioning differences included nine talk turns in the African American male groups (representing six participants in three groups), eight talk turns in the African American female groups (representing six participants in three groups), seven talk turns in the European American female groups (representing six participants in three groups), and eight talk turns in the European American male groups (representing five participants in all four groups). This shared level of passing reference to difference, however, was accompanied by distinctive "difference management" strategies.
White males and females managed the presence of difference by explicitly downplaying its significance, emphasizing the small numbers of differences and by asserting fundamental sameness. This denial of difference parallels findings in other race research that has not been focused directly on genetics. 31 In the White female group, de-emphasizing difference was the predominant strategy, used in 11 talk turns by 10 participants, and it appeared in all four groups. Six White males used this tactic six times in all four groups. But White males also relied heavily on numerical or frequency-based statements that emphasized that differences were few and small. Nine White males took 10 talk turns to make such points in three of the four groups. Additionally, White males were the most likely to make explicit statements of similarity or sameness. Such comments occurred in all four groups and included 11 different talk turns by 10 different White males.
This interchange captures the emphasis White males put on the predominance of similarity over difference.
71: "They are very similar I would say." 63: "Virtually identical."
Moderator: "Anybody think they are more different than someone?" 73: "Obviously there is. There are very, very small aspects that manifest in the expression of whichever genes it is. Has to be different genes or we would all be the same." 75: "But those differences are kind of minute."
Moderator: "Do you guys concur on that?" 63: "Yeah"
Only one woman in each racial grouping made statements explicitly emphasizing sameness in this fashion. Black men, however, used such statements with moderate frequency as part of a relatively sophisticated balancing strategy for similarity and difference.
The treatment of racial difference by African American males featured several components. Like African American women, African American men were relatively willing to emphasize racial differences and to do so in ways that might be understood as making race an essential characteristic of a person. Only two comments by White women and none by White men emphasized difference in this fashion, whereas six comments by Black males and eight by Black females did so. And Black males and females were far less likely (as noted above) to overtly downplay these differences. What Black men in particular did instead was to adopt the discourse of "sameness and difference," that is to assert that there were both fundamental similarities and fundamental differences between racial groups. Eight Black participants in 10 talk turns explicitly used this strategy in two of the groups, as it evolved in the form illustrated in the lengthy passage quoted above. Even in the other two groups, however, where the flow of the discussion did not lead to this explicit formulation, the components of "sameness" and "difference" were available among the comments of the participants.
African American women used a distinctive variation of the integration strategy. Where men had emphasized similarity and difference as distinct components that were then integrated in the rubric of "similarity and difference," African American women tended to meld similarity and difference through the discourse of racial mixing. They emphasized that races weren't pure and that appearances were deceiving; differences and similarities were slippery and shifting. Nine participants in all four groups took 11 talk turns to make comments on racial mixing. Only two African American males did so, only one European American female, and no European American males.
Overall, Whites tended to deal with difference by downplaying it and emphasizing similarity, whereas Blacks tended to integrate similarity and difference, either through a mixing metaphor or through statements that explicitly balanced the two components.
Conclusions and implications
This study does not tell us how the majority of lay people interpret the relationships between genetics and race. First, it studies how public discourse about genetics and race evolves, rather than providing a secret window to individual attitudes. Second, it does not constitute a large or a randomly selected sample. Based on these findings, of course, one could construct questions for a traditional public opinion poll to make such an assessment. It would likewise be possible to construct a test to assess how many members of the public share which portions of the scientific knowledge about genetics that some of its members clearly share. The results of this study suggest, however, that neither of these two approaches would give us an accurate and sufficient picture of the resources available to the society for constructing social policy about race and genetics.
This study clearly suggests that the social resources for the understanding and application of science are not best conceptualized solely in terms of individual knowledge and attitudes. The knowledge of a social group is a product of the interaction of the disparate knowledge of its several members. This study further suggests that the opinions and knowledge of the lay audience parallels much of what the mass media and the scientific establishment say about genetics, but these are not simple regurgitations of those discourses. Individuals and the groups in which they discuss particular issues clearly add to, sift, and rework scientific information and media discourses in terms of their social and cultural needs, interests, and values.
The social resources used by our participants for dealing with the notions of race and genetics seem substantial, if still incomplete in some ways. The range of opinions is wide. Some people believe that there is an essential, if small, genetic difference between races, and some people believe that there is no such fundamental difference. From this range of opinions, a social consensus position seems to emerge rather readily, holding that genetic differences between races are minor, and that they are primarily a matter of exterior, physical traits. Although Herrnstein and Murray may be right that, in more secretive venues, some of these individuals might still believe in more essential and racist notions of the relationship between race and genetics, given the collective set of knowledge resources about genetics, the process of discussion with other lay persons (rather than the impositions of media elites or political arbiters), seems to produce a more progressive consensus, rather than a more conservative one. The generalizability of our findings remains, of course, to be established.
These understandings of genetics and race are differently inflected in varying social groups based on their experiences and interests, such that members of different demographic groups are likely to mark different exterior racial traits as central identifiers of race and likely to reconcile the dialectics of similarity and difference through different discursive formulations. Members of the public also can collectively bring to bear in their formulations a basic understanding of most of the major forces that shape heredity.
These rich resources for dealing with genetics and race do not guarantee that all future discourse about genetics will be racially sensitive. The warnings of the critics remain germane. Even if private and sub-conscious attitudes are nationally consonant with what is expressed in these groups, racists might succeed, given enough press, in convincing substantial members of the public to alter their opinions and thence the collective discourse. Indeed, in later focus groups, where we have deliberately "seeded" and "legitimated" essentialized genetic talk about race, we have elicited more such talk (albeit still from a minority of participants, in specific geographic regions). Thus, legitimated articulations of genetically based racism can also have an effect on the dynamic of a conversation, and change public attitudes. Consequently, the sustained emphasis on differences in athleticism enunciated by some of our respondents may constitute a source of some concern.
Those cautions being emphasized, it remains the case that approaching public opinion as a complex rhetorical formation allows us to understand more fully the public resources that currently exist for resisting those perspectives. By focusing on the range of opinions available, rather than simply on the majority opinion, by focusing on the evolution of collective wisdom rather than on isolated opinion and knowledge, and by exploring demographically specific discourses, we gain a far richer picture of the dynamics of public opinion about race and genetics.
